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SIR KENNETH GRESSON : A STUDY IN 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING. 
Jeremy Finn* 
Despite a recent upwelling of interest in New Zealand's legal history,' 
writing in the field remains scanty. Much of what has been written over 
the years is invaluable in that it creates an accessible public record of 
events, institutions or the activities of individuals. Relatively few of the 
older writings display to any significant degree any attempt at analytical 
history of law and legal development - perhaps because much of the 
extant corpus is written for lawyers by lawyers; other works are on occasion 
limited because non-lawyer authors have not managed to master the legal 
issues involved in the events of which they write. Judicial biography is a 
specialised form of legal history, and in the limited number of biographies2 
of New Zealand judges so far published, instances of both these difficulties 
may be found. But these are not the reasons for scholars to take care with 
biographical writings. In New Zealand, as in most other Western countries, 
judicial biography is often undertaken by persons with familial or personal 
relationships to the subject of their study.3 Such accounts are often what 
Posner calls "edifying' accounts - that is they are designed to provide 
models or antimodeis for the reader's own life;4 others are attempts to lay 
a claim to the subject's place in history. Critical appraisal cannot be expected 
to form any significant element in such  writing^.^ Total objectivity may 
not be expected of any biographeq6 but without some approach thereto the 
resultant biography is of but limited value for later scholars. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Canterbury 
1 Since 1990, books on legal history topics include Brewster A History of the Early Law Firms in 
Rotorua 1898-1948 (Rotorua, East Brewster, 1992); Millen, The Story ofBell Gully Buddle Wezr 
(1840-1990 (Wellington, Bell Gully Buddle Weir, 1990); Spiller, The Chapman Legal Family 
(Wellington, VictoriaUniversity Press. 1992); Stone, The Making ofRussellMcVeagh (Auckland, 
Auckland University Press, 1992); Frame Salmond. Southern Jurist (Wellington, Victoria 
University Press 1995) and Spiller, Finn and Boast A New Zealand Legal History (Wellington, 
Brookers, 1996). No comparable corpus ofworks oflegal history has been published in any other 
decade. Articles on legal history topics have also become much more common, and more scholarly. 
2 No account is here taken of the brief biographical profiles often to be found as elements of more 
general historical works such as Cooke (ed) Portrait o j a  Profession . the Centennial Book of the 
New Zealand Law Society (AH and ALV Reed, Wellington, 1969) and Cullen LaMifully Occupied, 
the Centennial History of the Otago Law Society (Dunedin, the Society 1979); while useful as 
starting points for biographical enqulry such works seldom if ever present a sustained and detailed 
treatment of any individual. 
3 See as examples JG Denniston A New Zealand Judge. Sir .John Edward Denniston (Dunedin, 
Reed, 1945), WD Stewart Portrait of a Judge. Sir Joshua Strange Williams PC (Wellington, 
Whitcombe & Tombs, 1945) and A Alpers and J Baker ConJdent Tomorrows: A Biographical 
Self-portrait of OTJAlpers (Auckland, Godwit, 1993). As noted, the problem is endemic in all 
jurisdictions; compare Michael J Gerhardt "The Art of Jud~cial Biography" (1995) 80 Comell LR 
1595, 1596. 
4 Richard Posner "Judicial Biography" (1995) 70 NYULR 502, 503. 
5 Compare Dennis J Hutchinson "Judicial Biography: Amicus Curiae" (1995) 70 NYULR 723, 
724. 
6 J Woodford Howard (1995) 70 NYULR 533.547; Posner "Judicial Biography" (1995) 70NYULR 
502,5 14 suggests lawyer authors are conditioned to write biographies which are defensive of the 
subject. 
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The nature and scope of biographies may also limit their value in other 
ways. Both scholarly and lay biographies ofjudges tend to focus on judges 
whose lives were noteworthy for their activities off the bench - frequently, 
but not invariably, in politim7 Yet such biographies are often less than 
helpful in understanding the development of the law - which is as much 
or more the province of judges less known to the p ~ b l i c . ~  It is inherent in 
our view of judges as at least semi-autonomous actors that they may bring 
to the decision of cases a range of personal values and principles which 
inform and influence their judgments, at least in cases where the judge is 
not involuntarily constrained by authority.' Biographers may assist us to 
understand how the judge fulfilled that role."' As one American writer puts 
it 
A b~ographer 's  challenge IS to c la r~fy  how the subject d e c ~ d e d  cases and, In particular, to  
explaln the judge's approach to  jud ic~a l  decislon maklng ' I  
To understand and evaluate a judge's contribution to the development 
of the law, we need to know how, and why, the judge came to decide 
between competing outcomes in the way he or she did. In some studies 
there is simply no adequate discussion ofrelevant elements in the subject's 
judicial life. Judicial biographers often, and quite understandably, do not 
attempt to cover the divers legal issues that confront a judge in the course 
of a judicial career- instead focussing on specific areas, usually those public 
or constitutional law areas which may be the more readily comprehended 
by a lay reader (and perhaps also by a lay writer).I2 In New Zealand only 
two works, Spiller's biography of the Chapmans'' and Frame's biography 
of Salmond,14 attempt any substantial analysis of the subjects' legal 
reasoning in a number of areas of law. Even so the focus of Spiller's work 
is not on the Chapmans qua judges, but on other aspects of their lives and 
Frame concentrates, naturally and properly, on Salmond's stellar career 
before he was appointed as a judge. 
This essay attempts to place its primary focus on the judicial career of 
Sir Kenneth Gresson, and puts forward a hypothesis as to his judicial 
reasoning wh~ch may allow a better understand~ng of h ~ s  contribution to 
An exceptional instance is WH Dunn and ILM Richardson Sir Roherl Slout A Rlogruphy 
(Wellington, Reed, 1961) which contains but onc chaptcr, of 15, on Stout's lengthy career on the 
bench. A similar, if less marked, cmphasis is evident in Guy Lcnnard Sir Wrllium Murtin 
(Christchurch, Whitcombc & Tombs, 1961). 
Posner "Judicial Biographym (I 995) 70 NYULR 502, 5 16. 
See G Edward White "Thc Canonisation of Holmcs and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial 
Reputations" (1995) 70 NYULR 576, especially at 579, for an illuminating discussion of the 
epistemological consequences of perceiving humans as rational actors capable of controll~ng 
their destiny and the premising of biography on the theory that truth may be objectively examined. 
JA Thomson "Judicial Biography: Some 'fentative Observations on the Australian Enterprise" 
(1985) 8 UNSWLJ 380,381-2. 
Michael J Gerhardt "The Art of Judicial Biography" (1995) 80 Cornell LR 1595, 1597. Other 
writers hold different views ofthe function ofjudicial biography - as for instancc that the primary 
concern is to "develop a convincing account of the meaning of a human life" Robert Post "Judging 
Lives" (1995) 70 NYU LR 548,551. 
See the discussion by Gerald Gunther " 'Contracted' Biographies and other Obstacles to 'Truth' 
" (1995) 70 NYULR 697.699; see also John Philip Reid "Beneath the Titans" (1995) 70 NYULR 
653, 654-55. 
Peter Spiller The C'hupmu~z Lc.gal Fuml/v (Victoria liniversity Press 1992). While there is some 
discussion of Denniston J's cxerclse of h ~ s  judicial role In SG Raymond's account of Dcnniston 
as a judgc which is included in JG Denniston et al Memoir ofSir John Denniston (Christchurch, 
Gaskell & Co. 192h), the later more formal biography, JG Denniston A New Zeuland Judge: Sir 
John Edwurd Dennislon (Dunedin, Reed, 1945). is less helpful in this regard. 
Alex Frame Sultnond: Southern Jzrrrsl (Wellington, Victoria University Press 1995). 
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the law of New Zealand. Gresson is a suitable subject for study, as there is 
a very substantial corpus of reported judgments on which to draw.15 This 
corpus naturally falls into two parts - the decade he spent as one of New 
Zealand's most frequently reported puisne judges and the culmination of 
his judicial career in the five years he spent as first President of the 
permanent Court of Appeal from 1958. In those years Gresson played a 
pivotal role in shaping the practice and jurisprudence of the new Court. 
His role as President gave greater scope for him to expound legal principle 
than he had enjoyed as a puisne judge, even one who sat frequently on the 
Court ofAppeal in its earlier incarnation. More importantly, it is suggested 
that Gresson played a significant, if much misunderstood, role in the 
development of by the new Court of a more self-reliant jurisprudence which 
asserted a hitherto-unclaimed independence of English precedent. 
Sir Kenneth Macfarlane Gresson (1891 - 1974) is probably the best 
known member of one of New Zealand's foremost legal families, 
principally because of his service as the first President of the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal when it was set up in 1957 as a separate court. Prior to 
that he had been a judge of the Supreme Court for 10 years. KM, as Sir 
Kenneth was widely known, had strong family connections with the law 
through his grandfather Henry Barnes Gresson (1 819 - 1901) who was 
one of New Zealand's first Supreme Court Judges - serving in the 
Canterbury district from 1857 until he resigned when the government 
proposed to transfer most of the Supreme Court judges to different centres. 
Henry Barnes Gresson was also a very prominent member of the Anglican 
Church which then dominated Canterbury. KM's father, John Beatty 
Gresson (b. 1845) was admitted to the bar in 1873 and practised in 
Christchurch, though apparently not with marked success until his death 
in a railway accident in 1891 16, some months before Kenneth's birth. He 
was the youngest of seven children. One of his elder brothers Maurice 
James Gresson (1884 - 1948) also became a very successful lawyer; his 
son Terence Arbuthnot Gresson was a judge of the Supreme Court from 
1956 to his death in 1967; their descendants practice law in divers part of 
the country. On several occasions Kenneth Gresson sat in the Court of 
Appeal when his brother, or his nephew, or both were arguing cases; no 
objection to this appears ever to have arisen." 
Sir Kenneth was brought up in somewhat straitened circumstances, 
even after his mother re-married in 1893. He was however principally 
educated at Wanganui Collegiate, a private Anglican School in the town 
where his family then lived, (1 903 - 19 1 1); in which time he completed as 
an external student some of the courses required for a LLB degree from 
Canterbury University College. He moved to Christchurch in 1912, where 
15 The competition between the New Zealand Law Reports and the Gazette Law Reports ensured 
few if any noteworthy judgments escaped report. 
16 If indeed it was an accident. The coroner's jury returned a verdict of death following an accidental 
fall from the train (Chrlstchurch Press 24 March 1891); but the jury heard only evidence suggesting 
J B Gresson was in poor health and had had attacks of "giddiness" and "vertigo". The reports of 
witnesses (see Chrlstchurch Press 18 March 1891 and 24 March 1891) could assign no external 
reason for Gresson's fall, and made mention that he was, unusually, sitting in an outside seat on 
the train. No mention was made that Gresson was in financial difficulties. It appears this drove 
him at some point to embezzlement of client's funds ( see the statements of the facts in McGrath 
v Freer (1892) 10 NZLR 688. I am indebted to Cynthia Hawes for this reference). It may be 
thought that the facts leave open a real possibility of suicide. 
17 As for example in NZ Waterside Workers IUW v NZ Waterside Employers Industrial Association 
of Employers [I9481 NZLR 1164; [I9481 GLR 489 and J M  Heywood & Co Ltd v Attorney- 
General [I9561 NZLR 668 
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he was articled as a law clerk and continued his studies for the LLB ( 
though exempted attendance at lectures). Kenneth was commissioned in 
the NZ Territorial Forces in 19 1 1 (promoted lieutenant 19 12) and on the 
outbreak of war in 1914 served as a Captain and second-in-command of a 
company of the Canterbury Battalion which left New Zealand in October 
1914. He served with the battalion at Gallipoli (where he was promoted to 
major) until evacuation following a severe wound in the abdomen. 
Following prolonged treatment and repeated operations in Egypt, New 
Zealand and England he returned to Christchurch where he served as 
military representative on the Canterbury Military Service Board for the 
remainder of the war. He was at this time awarded the LLB without, it 
seems, sitting any examination. In 191 8 Gresson was admitted to the bar 
and began his professional career, first in partnership with others and from 
1930 on his own account, specialising in trusts, wills, administration and 
company work.ls 
KM was active within the Canterbury District Law Society, including 
serving as its president in 1937. He had a major impact on the legal 
profession in Canterbury as a teacher in the Law Faculty of Canterbury 
University College (1 923 - 1947), and Dean of the Law Faculty from 1936 
to 1947 (thus being a teacher of courses he had been exempted as a student). 
He was also a member of the first Law Reform Committee appointed by 
the Minister of Justice in 1937, in which capacity he was very influential 
in the enactment of the Law Reform Act 1944.19 He also found time for 
extensive involvement with the Anglican Church, serving in many 
capacities, including Chancellor of the Christchurch Diocese from 1943 
to 1946 and four times representing Christchurch at the General Synod of 
New Zealand.20 
Kenneth Gresson was appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court in 
1947, sitting in Wellington though circuit duties took him to all parts of 
the lower North Island. In addition he sat frequently as a member of the 
Court of Appeal of that time ( a panel of three or more Supreme Court 
Judges sitting together twice a year). In this time he consistently is among 
the "most reported" judges, and appears to have sat in a very significant 
proportion of the Court of Appeal sittings (though this may be as much a 
function of his frequent presence in Wellington as his capacity as a judge). 
There are certain areas of law where KM very rarely had cause to venture 
- he appears to have given judgment in only a single intellectual property 
case2' and although he sat in two cases involving Maori claims to lands on 
the basis of aboriginal title arguments, he in fact gave a substantive 
judgment in only one of these.22 
18 Personal information principally from Gresson's privately published memoir "A Histovy ofthe 
Gresson Fam~ly and in partzcular An account ofthe life and work of Henry Barnes Gresson" 
~ 1 9 7 1 ,  with additional mater~al and genealogical tables by CM Gordon. ; other biographical data 
is from archival sources, from papers in the possession of Gresson's daughter and conversations 
with her. 
19 This Act was recast as the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949. For Gresson's role, 
see Anon, [I9471 NZLJ 262, and autobiographical sketch in KMG papers. He was to give the 
most detailed and extensive of the judicial analyses of this act in the first case where it was 
considered by the Court ofAppeal: Nealon v Public Trustee [I9491 NZLR 148; [I9491 GLR 85 
20 Anglican Church Diocesan Yearbooks and proceedings of General Synods, in Archives ofAnglican 
Church, Christchurch Diocese. 
21 Goldpack Products Ltd v Citrus Products Ltd [I9561 NZLR 661. 
22 In re the Bed of the Wanganui Rzver [I9621 NZLR 600. He also sat in In re The Ninety-Mile 
Beach [I9631 NZLR 461. 
His reported judgmcnts in the field of wills and estates are perhaps his 
most substantial judicial contribution to the law, though this is not an area 
where any of his judgments eauscd much discussion or controversy. He 
also wrote leading judgments in criminal law and e ~ i d e n c c ~ ~  and 
administrative and public law. In that latter field we find some of his most 
interesting judgments and some of those that are most difficult to analyse. 
When a new specialist and permanent Court of Appeal, was created in 
1957, Gresson was appointed as the first President of the new court and 
served there until his mandatory retirement in 1963 on reaching the age of 
72. His judicial career concluded with his sitting as a member of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council for some months in 1963 - something 
Sir Kenneth (as he was by then) had initiated by writing to the British 
Lord Chancellor, thus initially bypassing thc New Zealand a u t h ~ r i t i e s . ~ ~  
During these months he heard at least a dozen eases. Unusually for the 
period he gave the opinion of the Privy Council in two of these eases.25 In 
later years he served as the first Chairman of the Indecent Publications 
Tribunal (1 964 - 1967). He died in 198 1 .  
Opinions of his judicial career are somewhat varied - Sir Kenneth has 
been called eonscrvative and unduly ready to follow English precedent,26 
or more simply "unpredictable"" though neither of these assessments are 
based on extensive analysis. The aim of this paper is to give a more 
thorough, and it is hoped more balanced, account of KM's judicial 
philosophy, and to try to explore and, perhaps, explain some of the seeming 
idiosyncrasies of his judgments. In his last years on the Court of Appeal 
Gresson expressed dissenting opinions more frequently than at any other 
stage of his judicial career. One possible influence in this was that at that 
time his judicial philosophy differed significantly from the other members 
of the court. He was in many ways a judicial conservative with a liberal 
personal philosophy; his colleagues had morc conservative personal 
philosophies but were inclined to permit themselves an active judicial rule 
in reformulation of the law. His decisions are also marked by the strongest 
regard for individual liberty and autonomy consistent with community 
needs. Perhaps linked to this was his vigilance to ensure that the position 
of the judiciary was given proper respect - for instance when President 
of the Court of Appeal, refusing to attend a ceremonial opening of 
parliament because he believed that changes to the arrangements for the 
ceremony downgraded the position of thc judges.lx 
Thirdly, Kenneth Gresson bclievcd devoutly that his faith required 
Christian conduct in every aspect of his life.2This Christian belief and his 
own compassion and humanity meant he was quick to seek to assist those 
he saw as deserving. 
23 Grcsson's leading judgments In thc law of cvidence are R v Ntridovici [I9621 NZLR 334 (see 
below 1158); K 1.Phi1lip.s [I 9491 NZ1.R 3 16 ; sub nomine 11' v Philli/,s (No I) [I 9481 GLR 270 and 
R v Phillips ('No 2) [I9481 GLR 271 and R I ,  H o r t ~  [I9491 NZLR 791 ; 119491 GLR 429. 
24 [1974]NZLJ511,512. 
25 Alrithge Dot? Het?zupc~lu v R [I9631 AC 859; [I 9631 3 All ER 632 and Chuluh v Khuleq [I9641 1 
All ER 824 ~-~ -~ - . 
26 Spiller, F~nn  & Boast, A N ~ M ,  %c.ulund LcCq1il Histol:v (Rrookcrs, Wellington 1996) p226 
27 Sir Richard WildCJ, [I9741 NZLS 51 l .  512 
28 119741NZI~JSI1,512 
29 kddr&s by KMG to congregation of Ardnurcher Church, Ireland 1955, copy of text In KMG 
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Some at least of his more notable judgments accord well with some of 
these principles, but it is an incomplete explanation. At first sight there are 
inconsistencies of approach which are difficult to understand - as when 
very liberal and enlightened dissenting views on censorship in In re Lolita3' 
or the requirement for a mental element for criminal liability were 
counterbalanced by adherence to old English authorities on the tortious 
liability of local bodies for failure to maintain roads3' or the view that 
parties appearin before Royal Commission had no automatic right to legal K repre~entation.~ Yet it is necessary to consider whether these perceptions 
may be inaccurate because of the current norm of scholarship whereby 
judicial decision-making is analysed in an intellectual framework which 
assumes judges undertake a balancing of different relevant principles and 
considerations. 
The aim of this article is to offer an alternative interpretation of Gresson's 
judicial decisions, an interpretation which goes suggests any apparent 
inconsistencies or idiosyncrasies are indeed more apparent than real. If 
KM's judgments are considered as being the product of a hierarchical 
ordering of desiderata or constraints, a much more consistent pattern is 
seen. To a large extent Gresson appears to have worked with a structure 
which ranked various norms or considerations in sequence - and the 
involvement of a higher order norm in any case precluded the lower order 
norm from being applied. 
A simple single-case example of this "hierarchy of norms" is provided 
by Snell v PotteP3 where the plaintiff sought to enforce a contract to transfer 
part of a farm to him; the agreement being that this would be occur when 
his existing marriage was terminated by divorce. Gresson J held that even 
if divorce was recognised by statute, contracts promoting it were still 
contrary to public policy - the legislative policy did not exclude the moral 
norm, so the moral norm could be relied on. However Gresson saw the 
claim to part of the farm as severable from provisions concerning the 
divorce, and as the plaintiff had substantially complied with the agreement 
and provided consideration, the plaintiff was entitled to some redress on a 
quantum meruit. In this case the moral norm as to public policy on divorce 
could be considered not to apply, so Gresson was still free to utilise a 
lesser norm, of substantial justice and fairness. 
Another more complex example is provided by a cluster of cases where 
the court was confronted with litigation where the incidence of government 
benefits or payments might affect the apparent interests of the parties. In 
Ramlose v Moult in 1952, Gresson J had to consider whether medical 
expenses were recoverable as damages for personal injury where the doctor 
in question had in fact been paid by Government sources and not by the 
plaintiff patient. He considered that they were so recoverable because the 
relevant Government department had a right (if seldom exercised) to make 
a claim for reimbursement from the plaintiff.34 
30 [I9611 NZLR 542, discussed below, n38. 
31 Fraser v Beckett & Stirling Ltd [I9631 NZLR 480, discussed below n43; Attorney-General v 
Hocking 119631 NZLR 513 
32 In re T Z ~  ~ o y d l  Commission to Inqulve into and Report upon State Services in New Zealand 
[I9621 NZLR 96. 
33 [I9531 NZLR 696. 
34 [I9521 NZLR 260; [I9521 GLR 177. 
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That case may be contrasted with McGill v McGill in 1958, where the 
issue was whether the court should order permanent maintenance to a wife 
in the sum of the "allowable income" before her social security benefit 
abated. On the first occasion this came before him, Gresson J considered 
that an order so worded might be contrary to public policy as effectively 
transferring the obligation of maintaining the wife from the husband to the 
state. He therefore required the party to make a fresh application and to 
serve copies of the documents on the Solicitor-General in case the 
Government wished to be repre~en ted .~~  When the case was re-argued, 
Gresson refused to make the requested order: 
... the Court is brought face to face with a proposal to benefit a party under an obligation at 
the expense of the community. The Court can, and in my opinion should, have regard to 
the effect of the proposed order, and not lend its aid to an agreement which is inimical to 
the public interest.36 
The issue of principle surfaced again in Wood v Attorney-General 37 
where the Crown sought apportionment of damages payable under Deaths 
by Accident legislation so as to terminate liability for pension payments to 
the deceased's dependents. Gresson P, giving the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal, considered such apportionment would be wrong, because it was 
no function of the court to consider the incidence of pensions or other 
benefits - that was a matter statute left to specific governmental bodies. 
Any apparent inconsistency in these cases is more apparent than real. 
In McGill v McGill Gresson was concerned to prevent individuals shifting 
their obligations to the state; in the other two cases the same principle 
might have applied but for the higher norm of respect for statute, in that 
that Parliament had conferred the relevant discretions on bodies other than 
the courts. 
This mode of analysis of course assumes that Gresson, consciously or 
sub-consciously, could identify the hierarchical norms relevant to any 
particular case. It further assumes that retrospective analysis will be able 
to make the same identification. The evidence suggests that the first 
assumption is more than reasonable, though the weight of evidence suggests 
the process was more sub-conscious or, at most, unarticulated. In the vast 
bulk of Gresson's reported judgments there is no evidence of any deliberate 
ordering of principles to achieve a particular result. Perhaps the closest he 
ever came to this is in his most famous single judgment, his dissent in In 
re lo lit^^^ where he would have held the book not indecent. There has 
been a tendency to see this as an unusual and somewhat surprising judgment 
for a normally conservative judge. This may over-estimate Gresson's 
personal conservatism - he was certainly far less censorious than some 
of his c o l l e a g ~ e s . ~ ~  The question was whether Nabokov's novel was 
indecent as "unduly emphasising matters of sex" as the statutory formula 
required. Gresson rejected the application of a test that the publication 
was 'offensive by community standards' because "..that is not what the 
Legislature has said" and because the test was unworkable since the 
community standard was too uncertain a standard for any single judge to 
apply.40 While he acknowledged that freedom of expression, something 
35 119581 NZLR 145. 146 
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he thought most precious, must give way to the public interest if a 
publication exalted "vice, viciousness or cruelty or is an incentive to 
immoral behaviour", Lolita posed no such threat and the proper response 
was to let the book into the public area and let parents keep it from their 
children - if they saw fit and if they could.41 The majority held otherwise. 
The case may reasonably be analysed as one in which Gresson 
consciously using rank ordered norms to reach his desired end. Primacy is 
given to applying the actual words of the statute -the highest norm - so 
that a lesser norm - a judicial rule - need not be complied with. Once it 
is shown on this level that Gresson is free not to follow the judge-made 
law, he can have regard to his lesser norms of minimising state interference 
with the individual and even to the desirability of the law according with 
practicalities. This analysis does not diminish the value or the ethical worth 
of Gresson's judgment, but it does allow a much better appreciation of 
how he came to the stance he did. 
In only one case does it appear that KM found himself really unable to 
determine satisfactorily the relevant principles he should apply. This 
occurred in In re Woodcock and Woodcock12 where Gresson J had to deal 
with an application, under a new statutory provision, for an order dispensing 
with the prohibition on marriage of stepfather and stepdaughter. Gresson, 
after indicating that "For myself, I find the idea of a man marrying his 
stepdaughter altogether repugnant" remitted the matter to the Court of 
Appeal on the rather unconvincing basis that the first decision on relevant 
principles should not be that of a single judge. 
An analysis in terms of rank-ordered norms also requires that any 
changes in the norms or their ordering can be identified. This is not difficult 
in Gresson's case as the only area of law in which there appears to have 
been any major change in his thinking over the years is the question of 
criminal liability being imposed without some mental element. In what 
appears to have been the last case he heard in the Court ofappeal, Fraser 
v Beckett & Sterling Ltd43 Gresson P uttered a powerful dissent against the 
majority verdict imposing absolute liability for an offence under the 
Customs Act on the basis that imposition of criminal liability without fault 
was an injustice, and the courts should only read a statute as so providing 
when the wording was clear. Years earlier, Gresson had held that it was 
not sufficient for a "special reason" for a conviction not to be entered that 
the defendant licensee neither knew of the relevant conduct nor was at 
fault.44 Even so, these cases might be thought to be reflect different 
hierarchical norms - in the licensee case earlier decisions on the section 
did not allow these matters to be considered, so that the "justice" norm 
had to be subordinated to following established law. By comparison, in 
Fraser v Beckett & Sterling Ltd the statute did not require the court to fix 
on any particular form of liability, so the "justice" norm was not excluded 
What then were the norms which may be deduced by analysing his 
judgments, and how was the hierarchy ordered? A more detailed discussion 
of the separate norms, in the order given below, follows, but the hierarchy 
may be seen as constituted thus: 
41 Ibid, 551-552; the words quoted are on p552. 
42 [I9571 NZLR 960,961. 
43 [I9631 NZLR 480. 
44 Gunn v Nicholls [I9491 NZLR 56; [I9481 GLR 547. 
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the obligation to apply the existing law as declared by parliament or 
the courts ( the former over-riding the other if conflicting); 
"legal formalism" or obedience to rules as to jurisdiction, pleadings 
and appellate review; 
restriction of state intervention on individual rights; 
"fairness" or abstract justice [ for the purpose of this article, this is 
considered in the context of divorce law]; 
pragmatism. 
111. THE OBLIGATION TO APPLY THE EXISTING LAW: STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION AND PRECEDENT. 
Many of Gresson's judgments, whether in the Supreme Court or Court 
of Appeal, turned on the application of existing rules Gresson considered 
to be binding on him. In accordance with standard constitutional rule, statute 
law took primacy over case law, but having acknowledged that distinction 
(and therefore the possibility of a subclass within the hierarchy), both kinds 
of rules can be discussed here. 
(a) Application of statutes and their interpretation 
Gresson had a very strong belief that only in rare cases was it proper 
for the courts to do anything other than apply a statute in its exact terms:45 
The Court has no right to fill in a gap which it supposes to exist in a statute but must leave 
it to the legislature to do so. It is bound absolutely by the language of the statute and must 
refrain from attributing to the Legislature anything which is not what it has said, since to 
do so would be a substitution of the Court's idea as to what would be appropriate for a 
literal and unimaginative interpretation of words which are direct and ~ n a m b i g u o u s . ~ ~  
Literal reading of the statute is however only the product of the relevant 
rule, not its embodiment. In his view, the primary obligation on the courts 
was to apply the words of the statute as representing Parliament j. intention 
- the primary norm. 
In some cases the literal rule could be displaced because the result was 
not to be taken as Parliament's intent because it was absurd or productive 
of injustice or real inconvenience ; 
It is well settled that an Act of Parliament is to be construed by giving to the words used 
their natural and ordinary meaning unless there is some very strong ground, derived from 
context or reason, why they should not be so c~ns tmed .~ '  
Then and only then were the courts free to search for alternative readings 
of the statute "to avoid repugnance, absurdity or in ju~ t i ce" .~~  Thus in 
Commissioner oflnland Revenue v West- Walker49 Gresson considered that 
a provision in income tax legislation authorising the Commissioner to 
demand information from "every person" had not removed protection 
accorded by the common law rules as to legal professional privilege. On 
45 Tax statutes in particular were to be read literally: Cornm~ssioner oflnland Revenue v .V VPhilips 
Gloeilampenfabrlken [I9551 NZLR 868, 882. 
46 Auckland Harbour Board v Kaihe [1962] NZLR 68, 85. He later c~ ted  ( at 86) the well known 
dictum of Lord Simonds in ,Waror and St Mellons RDC v Ne~cport Coruoratlon [I9521 AC 189, 
191 about "naked usuruatlon of'the legislative function under the thin disguise ofjnte&etationn. 
47 Bartlett v Bolt [I9491 ~ Z L R  732,73z [I9491 GLR 459.460. - 
48 Hopper v Gear Meat Co Ltd [I9481 NZLR 327, 335 : sub nom Inspector of Factories v Gear 
Meat Co Ltd [I 9481 GLR 1 I 1, 11 5. Compare the reasoning in C & A  Odlin Timber and Hardware 
Lid v Gray [I9611 NZLR 41 1 and Campbell v Russell [I9621 NZLR 407. 
49 [I9541 NZLR 191, 212-213. 
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rarer occasions Gresson did also call in aid the statutory embodiment in 
the Acts Interpretation Act 1924, s(5j) of the mischief rule.50 
(b) Precedent 
At the heart of Gresson's judicial philosophy is the idea that judges 
must work by rule and precedent. In one case he started his judgment thus: 
In deciding whether, in the circumstances of the case, the transaction brought about a valid 
contract of sale the duty of the Court is to 'apply rigorously the settled and well-known 
rules of law', That was how the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cairns) opened his judgment in the 
leading case of Cundy v Lindsay (1873) 3 App Cas 459.'' 
It is pertinent here to note that, particularly in his later years, he cited 
little authority, preferring instead to focus on what he saw as the relevant 
p r i n ~ i p l e . ~ ~  This reflects a continuing view of his that citation of overmuch 
authority was unhelpful - in one judgment he expressed it thus: "many 
cases were cited in argument, and I have read them, but they tend rather to 
perplex than to clarify my mind"53 and at his valedictory sitting of the 
Court of Appeal he made special mention of the need for argument in 
court to be more focussed on p r i n ~ i p l e . ~ ~  
Perhaps the most revealing statement of his view of "justice according 
to law" came in Thomas v Thomas5j a case involving matrimonial property, 
where the statute empowered the judge to make "such order as he saw fit '. 
Gresson considered a number of relevant cases, and expressed 
dissatisfaction with an English case56 where the English Court of Appeal 
had suggested that, provided any order made was not contrary to any 
established~rinciple of law, the judge could deal with the matter by "palm- 
tree justice - ie by a discretionary decision according to the judge's 
personal view of the merits: 
With respect, I venture the view that resort to 'palm-tree justice' is a principle, or rather an 
absence of principle, that is undesirable. The case is a striking illustration of what might be 
expressed shortly in Latin: Quot palmae, tot sententiae." 
Given that the courts should apply rule-based justice, whence came the 
rules? In Gresson's case, from the common law - and the common law 
was principally that laid down in England. A succinct statement of his 
views is to be found in his dissenting judgment in R v Naidovici 58 as to 
whether a document used by a witness to refresh the witness's memory 
and then adopted by that witness was itself admissible as evidence. The 
majority of the Court held it was, relying on American authority. Gresson 
would not accept that view: 
50 See Williams v Commiss~oner ofStamp Duhes [I 9481 NZLR662; [I9481 GLR223 and Kenszngton 
v Pearson [I9481 NZLR 695; [I9481 GLR 206; In re Ashton, Szddall v Gordon [I9551 NZLR 
193.200 
5 1 ~ a w c e t t  v Star Car Sales Ltd [I9601 NZLR 406,411. 
52 Eg In re Kallil, Koorey v Kallil [I 9571 NZLR 10,25. 
53 In re Liverton, New ZealandInsurance Co Ltd v McKenzie [I9511 NZLR 351,363; [I9501 GLR 
524, 526. 
54 [I9631 NZLJ 121, 123. 
55 119561 NZLR 785. 
56 Rimmer v Rzmmer [I9531 1 QB 63; [I9521 2 All ER 863. 
57 119561 NZLR 785, 789. The epigram means "There will be as many opinions as there are palm 
trees" and is a neat play on the well known Latin tag "Quot homines, tot sententzae" ( There will 
be as many opinions as there are men). 
58 119621 NZLR 334. 
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Many American decisions have held that whcrc a witness verifies and adopts the written 
record of a past transaction it thereby becomcs part of thc witness's testimony and admissible 
accordingly, but I am not aware of any decision in England or any Commonwealth country 
which has modified the strict rule of evidence rendering such a document inadmissible as 
settled in England by a strong trend of authority and statcd to bc the law by all the English 
textbook  writer^.^" 
In other cases too, Gresson showed his great respect for English appellate 
decisions: 
Whether or not these opinions expressed werc obitcr dicta or judicial dicta, that is to say, 
whether they were irrelevant to the cases in which they respectively occurred or whether 
they were, though forming no part of the ratio dccidendi, yet relevant to somc collateral 
matter may, I think, be disregarded. Since they emanated from the House of Lords and the 
Privy Council, they must command the rcspect properly duc to any exposition of thc law 
proceeding from either of thosc sources.h0 
In assessing these views of Gresson, it must be remembered that he 
worked within a very Anglophile professional atmosphere. In many cases 
it is clear that cases before Gresson were argued by counsel who cited as 
relevant authority English decisions, even though based on differently 
worded legislation6' or of such antiquity as to be of little value.62 However 
KM was, from his earliest days, astute to point out cases where such English 
decisions provided little a s~ i s tance .~~  It may also be noted that several 
New Zealand judges, including Gresson, in the 1950s had a curious 
linguistic habit of using words "the Court ofAppeal" to refer to the English 
court; when the New Zealand Court ofAppeal was mentioned, it was "our 
Court of 
There were occasions on which Gresson expressed views that a decision 
of the House of Lords had settled an area of law "beyond question"65 but 
such phrases may be found in judgments of many other judges.66 However 
KM was ready to distinguish decisions of the House of Lords or Privy 
Council when he saw proper grounds to do so."' His views as to the weight 
to be accorded English Court of Appeal decisions must also be noted. 
Although he took no part in the leading decisions of the 1940s and 1950sbs 
where the Court ofAppeal sought to fetter its own freedom to depart from 
59 [I 9621 NZLR 336-7. 
60 In re McEwen (deceased); Mc,Ewen v Day 119551 NZLR 575.580. 
6 1 Eg see Brand v Zavos [I9481 NZLR 1 119471 GLR 492; Bilderdeck v Manson & BarrLtd 119481 
NZLR 58; [1947] GLR 507; It7 re Brol~lzy, Yaldwyn v Martin [I 9491 NZLR 1006, 10 16; [I 9491 
GLR 577,581. 
62 R v Lacey 119531 NZLR 43 1 .  
63 In re L o ~ v ~ y i  Trusts, Logan 1. Low,rl, [I9481 NZLR 738; 772; sub nom Lowry v Logan [I9481 
GLR 315, 33 I ;  Ba,ss v The King [ I  9481 NZLR 777; 119481 GLR 305 and llutt Valley Electric- 
Power Board v Lower Hutt Cit-v Corporation [I9491 NZLR 61 1; [I9491 GLR 395. 
64 See eg In re an Arbitration, Hinurewa Kawe v Herlihy [I 9521 NZLR 65; [I9521 GLR 90 (Fair J); 
Fear :s Radios and Cvcle Co Ltd v Dominion L1f2 A.s.surance Oflice ofNew Zealand Ltd [I 9591 
NZLR 873 (KMG) 
65 Campbell v Rus.sel1 [I9621 NZLR 407, 4 16. 
66 Eg Morgan v Kh,vutt [ 19621 NZLR 79 I, 794 per Cleaty J.  
67 See for cxample Commissioner of Tuxes v LuttreN 119491 NZLR 823, 858; [I9491 GLR 469,483; 
In Re C K, (Deceased), M v L [I 9501 GLR 297; Hihherds b'oundry Ltdv Hal-dy [I9531 NZLR 14 
sub nom IIardy v Hihherds Foundry Ltd ; [I9511 GLR 504.; Watson v Miles [I9531 NZLR 958; 
Nationul Mutual Life As.soc,zatton of'Austruliu Ltd 1.Attorne.v-Gmerul [I9541 NZLR 754; Peerless 
Bakery Ltd v Walts [I9551 NZLR 339. 
68 In re Rayneu, Daniell v Rayner [I 9481 NZLR 455; Pre.ston v Preston [I 9551 NZLR 125 I; Smith v 
Wellington Woollen Manufbcluring Co. [I 9561 NZLR 491 
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English Court of Appeal decisions, it is doubtful whether Gresson agreed 
with them.6y 
Perhaps the most criticised, and most misunderstood of Gresson's 
judgments is his dissenting opinion in Corbett v Social Security 
Cornrni~,sion'~' where he held that the court could not go behind a ministerial 
claim of Crown privilege to prevent the release of documents; the majority 
held otherwise. The point was difficult because there was a conflict of 
authority between a decision of the Privy Council and a subsequent decision 
of the House of Lords.71 Gresson P makes clear in his judgment that if the 
matter was one where he believed the Court of Appeal to be free to chose 
its own view, he would have followed the Privy Council because of the 
potential for abuse if Ministerial claims could not be reviewed. The real 
difference is that he, unlike the majority, concluded, that the law required 
the court to follow the House of Lords where there was a conflict of this 
nature. Thus the higher norm of obedience to the law, as he perceived it, 
left no room for the operation of the lesser norm of restriction of 
unreasonable activities by the Executive. 
(c) Law reform and the role of the courts 
For Gresson, one corollary of this rule-based approach was it was not 
for the courts or the judiciary to change unilaterally any settled rules of 
law. This underlies Gresson P's dissent in Hocking v Attorney-General7' 
where he considered that the old, anomalous but established rule exempting 
local bodies from liability for non-feasance still applied in New Zealand. 
This did not preclude the courts from pointing out to the legislature the 
desirability of reform by statute where this was desirable: 
I would add that ,  having regard to the possibility that in some cases a strict application of 
the statute might well result in considerablc hardship, and perhaps injustice, there might 
well be provided some modification of the stark provisions of the Act. That however is a 
matter for the Legislat~re. '~ 
Similarly in another case where Gresson was one of the majority holding 
a plaintiff could not recover damages at common law from the occupier of 
premises because the plaintiff was only a licensee, he said: 
In conclusion I express the hope that, as in England there has been an attempt in the 
Occupier's Liability Act 1957 to produce order out of chaos by abolishing the common 
law distinction between invitces, licensees and contractual visitors, in New Zealand there 
may also be legislation with the same object.74 
Statutory reform did come in that case, though not for some three years.75 
69 See inManawatu Cutchment Board v Taylor [I 9491 NZLR 910,911; [I9491 GLR 5 16 his citation, 
with approval, of dicta by Myers CJ in Boyes v Carlyon [I9391 NZLR 504, 511 that the New 
Zealand Court ofAppeal should always follow earlier decisions of its own if they conflicted with 
English Court of Appeal decisions. One of the minor mysteries of the development of rules as to 
precedent in New Zealand is why Boyes v Carlyon was not referred to in In re Rayner, Daniell v 
Rayner [I9481 NZLR 455. sub nom In re Rayner, Ravner v Daniell [I9481 GLR 51. 
70 [I9621 NZLR 878 
71 Robinson v State ofSouth Australia [ I  93 11 AC 704 (PC); Duncan v CammeN Laird & Co Ltd 
[ I  9421 AC 624; [I9421 1 All ER 587 (HL). 
72 [1963]NZLR513,519. 
73 Whitwell v SIMU Mutual insurance A.s.socuztion [1960] NZLR 433,443. Compare the suggestion 
for reform in In Re F (A protectedperson) [I9561 NZLR 641 
74 Percival v Hope Gibbons Ltd [I959 ] NZLR 642, 658-9. 
75 Occupiers Liability Act 1962. 
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IV. LEGAL FORMALISM 
Gresson had very clear views that the administration ofjustice required 
the courts to respect the jurisdiction of other bodies, judges to respect the 
decisions of juries and for cases to be dealt with in accord with procedural 
rules. These beliefs may collectively and conveniently be called "legal 
formalism"; collectively they make up a vital second-order norm by which 
Gresson decided cases. 
(a) Jurisdictional rules 
There are a number of cases where Gresson refused to decide matters 
on the grounds that the questions involved were for bodies other than the 
Court in which he sat . Thus he was of the opinion that the court should 
refuse to answer cases stated or questions put to it if these involved findings 
of fact where statute entrusted the determination of fact to another tribunal.76 
In another case he declined to give a declaratory judgment as to whether 
certain local body employees were covered by an industrial award, on the 
basis that the Court of Arbitration was the proper place for such matters to 
be determined.77 His reluctance to trespass on the precincts of other bodies 
continued through his career - in 1962, he took the view, dissenting from 
his colleagues, that it was a matter for a Royal Commissioner to determine 
what if any parties had a right to be represented and to pa r t i~ ipa te .~~  Nor 
was he ready to use the declaratory judgment procedure where facts might 
be in dispute, since fact-finding was a different element of the court's 
juri~diction.~~ 
(b) juries, judges and appellate review 
In dealing with jury verdicts, there were two relevant principles. In the 
majority of cases, Gresson was content to proceed on the basis that the 
determination of facts was the province of the jury and it mattered not that 
the judge might have had a different view of the facts.80 In most cases 
application of that norm sufficed to conclude any argument on the facts." 
However in a few cases it did not. If the verdict of the jury was totally 
unreasonable because the finding had no evidence to support it, Gresson 
would appear to have seen the norm of respect for jury findings of fact as 
in conflict with the norm that litigants were entitled to have cases 
determined according to law.82 
76 In re Hawkek Bay Motor Company Ltd andMinister ofRailways [I9491 NZLR 445; [I9491 GLR 
203; In re an Arbitration, Richards and State Fire insurance General Manager [I9511 NZLR 
695 
-,- 
77 Wellington Municipal Oficeus Assoc~ation (Inc) v Wellington City Corporation [I9511 NZLR 
786; [I9511 GLR 414 
78 In re The Royal Commission to Inquire into and Report upon State Services in New Zealand 
119621 NZLR 96. 
79 In re a Lease, Barber v Hanfling [I9481 NZLR 855 , sub nom Barber v HanJing 119481 GLR 
I ) C 9  
J J J  
80 See among many examples Gresson's judgments in Cole v Jones [I9541 NZLR 699, Hibberds 
Foundry Ltd v Hardy 119531 NZLR 14; sub nom Har* v Hibberds Foundry Ltd [I95 11 GLR 504 
and JMHeywood & Co Ltd vdttorne-v-General [I9561 NZLR 668. As with most of his colleagues, 
he was more prepared to intervene where the issue for the appellate court involved drawing 
inferences from admittedly truthful evidence: Billy Higg.~ & Sons Ltd v Baddeley [I9501 GLR 
219,224 
81 KMG was strongly ofthe view that the court's jurisdiction on Issues of law should not be artificially 
restricted by mls-classificat~on of issues as being ones of fact alone : Commissioner of Taxes v 
McFarlane 119521 NZLR 349, 373-4; (19521 GLR 187, 193. Compare CIR v Walker 119631 
NZLR 339. 
82 Jensen v Hall [I9611 NZLR 800, 810-11, compare Hoanz v Wallis [I9561 NZLR 395. 
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Similar, though perhaps slightly different, principles applied to appellate 
review of decisions by judges sitting alone. Although Gresson was always 
reluctant to over-ride decisions of fact made by a tribunal which had seen 
and heard witnesses - indeed his first substantive judgment in the Court 
of Appeal, only months after he had been elevated to the bench stressed 
exactly that pointg3 -he was readier to over-ride findings by judges sitting 
without a 
In exercising appellate jurisdiction, Gresson's judgments on occasion 
reveal a conflict of norms as where the norm of respect for findings in the 
court below clashed with a higher norm imposed by statute or the general 
law. Thus in a custody case, Gresson dissented from the majority's decision 
to uphold the trial judge's discretionary decision to award custody of a 
very young child to the father. 
It may be that the restraint to which an appellate tribunal should subject itself is less stringent 
where the exercise of discretion appealed against is no mere matter of practice or procedure 
but is a matter of such prime importance as the welfare of an infant whose right to have 
decided what is best for him or her is the first and paramount considerat i~n.~~ 
That passage may be analysed as holding that the statutory or legal rule 
or norm of primacy of the interests of the child displaces the lesser rule as 
to appellate respect for the trial judge's findings. 
(c) Procedure 
Gresson was always careful to ensure that he did not give a judgment 
which might affect the position of parties not before the court - in one 
case involving construction of a statute affecting a right to object to re- 
grading of a civil servant, he insisted on an adjournment so the Public 
Service Board of Appeal could indicate either a willin ness to be 
represented in the matter or to abide the decision of the court5 In another 
case, Glubb v C ~ r n p b e l l ~ ~ ,  Gresson J refused to give a declaratory judgment 
as to the powers of the Public Service Board because not all the public 
service officers affected were parties to the action - he did however give 
a judgment on the point in issue on the basis that it bound only the present 
parties. In one early case he went even further, to expressly state that though 
he gave his opinion on a point, his statements were obiter dicta and he was 
not to be taken as judicially determining the question.g8 
Perhaps predictably, Gresson's formalist beliefs were shown in his not 
infrequent (though not always successful) insistence that litigants conduct 
their cases in strict accordance with the pleadings - "A litigant must be 
held to the case he sets up.. ."g9. In another case he put his view thus: 
The Court of Appeal is not, in my view, free to remould the case; its function is to decide 
whether the judgment of the trial judge on the case as presented was right. If it was, it 
should not be set aside on appeal.90 
83 Caldwell v Kirby [I9481 GLR 335. 
84 In re Rhodes (Deceased), Vennell v Godby [I9611 NZLR 65, 86. 
85 Palmer v Palmer [I9611 NZLR 702, 707. 
86 Bartlett v Bolt [I9491 NZLR 732 ; [I9491 GLR 459. 
87 [I9501 GLR 79 
88 Walker v Akatarawa Sawmilling Co Ltd [I9491 GLR 286,287. 
89 Heard vNZForestProducts Ltd [I9601 NZLR 329,342 (dissenting in this case). See also Beryman 
v Toup-Nicolas [I9581 NZLR 1170. 
90 Reporoa Stores Ltd v Treloar [I9581 NZLR 177, 195. It is interesting to note that F B Adams J, 
probably Gresson's principal rival among the puisne judges for the Presidency of the Court of 
Appeal, was much more prepared to allow new matters to be raised on appeal ( see [I9581 NZLR 
177, (200). One may speculate that Gresson's more conservative views on this point might have 
influenced his selection ahead ofAdams J. 
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Gresson's belief in the sanctity of the pleadings was not mirrored by 
any perception that he was limited to the material cited by counsel in 
reaching his decision. In innumerable cases KM went well into matters 
very much more deeply than had counsel, and indeed in some cases appears 
to have taken as the guiding authority cases not cited in argument.91 
However any seeming inconsistency can again be explained if one considers 
his beliefs to be hierarchical - the principle that cases were to be decided 
on the pleadings gives way to a belief that cases must be decided according 
to law. 
A significant number of Gresson's judgments reflect his concern that 
the state or its agencies should not impinge on individual rights unless 
proper authority existed for the infringement. He recognised that individual 
rights could not be paramount, but required invasion of them to be justified: 
It is understandable that any owner will resent interference with his proprietary rights but, 
when it is authorised by law in the general interests of the public, the private owner has to 
submit with a good grace. But it is equally the case that, where any invasion of private 
rights is authorised by statute, the terms of the statute must be strictly complied with.92 
The requirement that governmental agencies have proper grounds for 
their actions is a recurrent theme, whether in insisting that a municipal by- 
law authorising the destruction of stock found to be unfit for consumption 
be squarely within the empowering statute93 or in declaring that a Cabinet 
Minister, as an officers of state, had: 
no special powers and immunity simply because he is such an officer; any power which he 
exercises or any immunity which he claims must be based on a proper legal f o ~ n d a t i o n . ~ ~  
Further strong statements of his views appear in Deynzer v Campbell 
where Gresson J was one of two dissenting judges who would have granted 
an injunction to a public servant seeking to prevent his transfer from the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to another department 
after refusing to disclose to the Public Service Commission whether or not 
he was a communist. Gresson reasoned that although the appellant's 
contract of employment contained an implied term that the Crown could 
transfer the employee on "public interest" grounds, the relevant statute 
required this power be used only after a proper inquiry and hearing 
I know of no authority that the Crown can, even where the overwhelming interest of public 
safety demands, over-ride the provisions of a statute to which it has assented to the extent 
of denying rights it confers.95 
and again, even more trenchantly : 
A wholesale suspension of law, accompanied by far-reaching powers to the Executive, is 
common in wartime: if something of the sort, of a more limited character, is expedient in a 
time of peace (so called) it is for the Legislature to confer it, not for the Commission to 
assert it without authority. 96 
91 Drewztt vPrice Tribunal [I9591 NZLR 21, 39; compare judgments based on his own research in 
eg Shore v Thomas [I9491 NZLR 690; [I9491 GLR 270 ; In re Fox and Fox [I9491 NZLR 722 , 
sub nom R v Fox [I9491 GLR 461; Watson v Miles [1953] NZLR 958; R v Greening [1957] 
NZLR 906; R v Cottle [I9581 NZLR 999;. 
92 Connolly v Palmerston North CC [I9541 NZLR 1006, 1008. 
93 Everton v Levin Borough [1953] NZLR 134, 136; compare Adams v Hutt County [I9571 NZLR 
776 
94 ~ e 2 e s s  Bakery ~ t d  v watts [i9551 NZLR 339,343 
95 [I9501 NZLR 790,828; [I9501 GLR 432,446. 
96 [I9501 NZLR 790,829; [I9501 GLR 432,446. 
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Another aspect of Gresson's views as to state power and its limits was 
shown in Matthews v DwanY7 where he had to consider the powers of a 
police constable to enter private land without a warrant. He gave an 
extensive discussion of the English case law and held that as the New 
Zealand statute which governed the point did not authorise entry without 
warrant, such entry was unlawful. 
Because Gresson accorded primacy among his judicial principles to 
obedience to positively stated law, his concerns about governmental 
intrusion on individual liberties on occasion had to be subordinated to his 
normal literal interpretation of statutes. Thus in Buller Hospital Board v 
Attorney-GeneraP8 he held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration 
that it had been improperly replaced by a Ministerially-nominated 
commission, because the relevant statute did not require the Minister to 
act in accordance with any principles of natural justice: 
In so holding I am not unmindful that the community relies, and properly relies, upon the 
Courts to contain executive action within its appointed limits and so to protect the individual 
against abuse of executive power.. . However we can only take the section as it is; and, in 
my opinion, Parliament having seen fit in language which is plain and unambiguous to 
confer this power upon an Minister of the Crown the rules of natural justice cannot be 
applied. Whether the Legislature should have given such a power is not for me to say. The 
Court cannot question the omnipotence of Parliament.99 
VI. FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE: THE EXAMPLE OF DIVORCE 
It is clear that Gresson's opinions as to divorce were well ahead of 
contemporary society (including the Anglican Church of which he was 
such an active member) and very much more progressive than many of his 
fellow judgesloo. These opinions seem to spring essentially from his views 
as to the injustice and unfairness of the contemporary law. If no rule required 
him to decide in a particular way, he would always seek a result consistent 
with his perceptions of individual justice. Thus early in his judicial career 
Gresson was one of two dissenters from a decision that judicial discretion 
to refuse a decree of divorce should always be exercised against a petitioner 
who had breached a separation agreement or deed ( in this case by a 
prolonged failure to pay maintenance): 
In the circumstances of this case I do not think this husband petitioner ought to be held, as 
a kind of punishment, in what is (for him at any rate) the servitude of a marriage which 
fourteen years ago ceased de facto to be a marriage, merely because of his default, 
inexcusable though it may have been, over some portion of the fourteen years. Adissolution 
of the marriage seems to me in this case to be desirable in the public interest.'O1 
For most of his judicial career, the court was required, in relation to 
some grounds for divorce, to refuse a decree if the ground in question had 
arisen through the "fault" of the petitioning party. Gresson readily 
recognised that such provisions were often productive of injustice -he 
thought a judicial discretion was far preferable to an absolute bar of this 
kind.lo2 In one such case, where a petition based on a separation agreement, 
97 [I9491 NZLR 1037; [I9491 GLR 582 
98 [I9591 NZLR 1259. 
99 r19591 NZLR 1259. 1293. Clearv J concurred: North J dissented. 
100 See his views in  right v ~ v i g h i  [1954] NZLR 417, 428-9 (joint judgment with Hay J) and 
Crewes v Craves [I9541 NZLR 11 16, 11 2 1. 
101 Davis v Davis [19501 NZLR 115,130; 119491 GLR 520,53 1. Gresson did point out the wife had 
a separate action to recover the arrearsbfmiintenance. 
102 Raymond v Raymond [I9581 NZLR 162, 165 
Sir Kenneth Gresson : A Study In Judicial Decision Making 497 
had to be declined because the petitioner had caused the separation by 
associating with another woman, who had subsequently borne several 
children and who he now wished to marry, Gresson concluded his judgment 
in words which it is difficult to imagine any other judge of the time 
expressing: 
In conclusion I express the hope that the respondent, having vindicated her position and 
established that the separation was not due to any fault of hers, may be large-hearted enough 
to consider the unfortunate plight of the three young children [of the husband and his de 
facto spouse], for whom life is being made painful and difficult because their father and 
mother are unable to legitimate them by marriage , and will herself seek a dissolution of 
her marriage on her own petition, to help these children.Io3 
To fill out the picture, it should be noted that although Gresson was in 
favour of divorce as a means of resolving failed marriages, he was always 
protective of the rights to proper maintenance of the first spouse.104 
VII. PRAGMATISM 
In a number of cases where Gresson found no rules of law to constrain 
his decisions, he sought to find pragmatic and just solutions to problems 
where the law might operate unfairly or unreasonably - as in R v PrattIo5 
where Gresson J found that a defendant did not, on the law, have a grounds 
to challenge for cause jurors who had sat in a related trial, but as it was 
undesirable these jurors should sit, he would adjourn the trial for a week 
so a new jury panel would be available. A similarly pragmatic solution is 
to be found in a case involving an application by trustees to allow the sale 
of trust property to a trustee106 , where Gresson noted that the trustee had 
not put in the highest tender for the property but as statutory approval of 
the sale was required and would not be forthcoming at any of the tendered 
prices, there was no objection to a sale to a trustee at the maximum figure 
for which approval should be given. However pragmatism was never 
allowed to over-ride legal formalities or requirements where these 
safeguarded the rights of others, whether or not parties to the litigation or 
give rise to a risk of the court begin prevented from discharging its duties 
properly. lo' 
This pragmatic view appeared in criminal cases too - as where Gresson, 
giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, held that the "exceptional" 
course of entering an acquittal rather than ordering a re-trial in a case of 
domestic assault should be taken because: 
There are other features which dispose us to this course - namely that the wife has 
throughout declined to testify against her husband, and we are told that she and her husband 
are living together and we should be sorry to do anything which might disrupt the home.'08 
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In a number of cases Gresson used the power of the court to award or 
withhold costs as a method of reflecting his views of the merits of the 
litigants - as where costs were not awarded to a plaintiff because a hearing 
had been protracted because of the plaintiff's extreme and unreasonable 
claim'09 or successful appellants were deprived of costs in the Court of 
Appeal or in the court below because the appeal succeeded on a ground 
not seriously argued earlier."O In one case in the Supreme Court, Gresson 
J deprived a successful defendant of costs on the basis the defendant had 
persisted with an unnecessary and unfounded ground of defence up to and 
at trial, but in that case it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the costs 
order partially reflected Gresson's expressed view that ". . .the plaintiff 
has failed in the action, even though the merits appear to be on his side"."' 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This article has essayed a novel approach to analysing the factors 
influencing a judge's determination of cases. Instead of looking to the 
personal or cultural factors which may have affected or created the values 
important to the judge, this study of Gresson's judgments has proceeded 
on the basis that a better understanding of his decisions, and his contribution 
to New Zealand law, is gained if analysis proceeds by seeking to re-create 
the intellectual framework within which he operated, consciously or 
unconsciously than by a traditional scanning of his life for events which 
may have influenced particular decisions. That consistency allows a much 
more informed judgement to be made about both his career and about the 
reasoning underlying any particular judgment. If, as has been contended, 
the attempt to discover a consistent pattern of applying a set of norms 
explains Gresson's judicial decision-making, it may be that analyses of 
this kind may be successfully undertaken for some other judges. In 
Gresson's case, a search for the underlying structure of his understanding 
of law, and approach to applying it to cases in which he sat, permits a quite 
different evaluation of his career. Instead of the surface inconsistency or 
idiosyncrasy attributed to Gresson, there appears an remarkable underlying 
consistency in his judgments. He can be seen not as a judicial maverick 
but for what he was, a deeply humane man who bent his talents to deciding 
cases according to the principles he believed the law and the legal system 
required him to apply. 
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